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Cover illustration: 
Block diagram and illustration of a hypothetical gamma ray inspection system with an information 
barrier. The key elements of the information barrier include: (1) opaque, grounded conducting 
enclosures, which prevent telltale EM emanations from the electronics; (2) simplified acquisition and 
analysis computer with most components on a single board; (3) tungsten iris, which opens and closes 
to optimize the live time of the measurement while keeping the included solid angle uncertain; (4) 
“Security watchdog” which activates on indications of events which threaten data security (e.g., 
opening of the enclosure); (5) data barrier, which isolates via optical fiber or some other one-way 
transmission path, and (6) the simplified user display. 
 
From J. K. Wolford Jr. and G. K. White ‘Progress in Gamma Ray Measurement Information Barriers 
for Nuclear Material Transparency Monitoring’. Article submitted to The Institute of Nuclear Materials 
Management Annual Meeting, New Orleans, LA, July 16-20, 2000. Figure 3. 
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Verification of Nuclear Weapon Dismantlement 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This work was carried out at the request of the Head of Strategic Technologies at the 
Ministry of Defence (MoD) during the period March-December 2011. It draws on information 
provided at an unclassified workshop held at University College London on 10 March, at 
which MoD and Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) staff made presentations on the UK 
programme, and on more detailed information provided to security-cleared members of the 
British Pugwash Group (BPG) at Aldermaston on 4 April and at MoD on 24 November. Lists 
of BPG participants in these meetings are given in Annex 1. Following the first classified 
meeting, a discussion was held among the members of the BPG team on 21 April, at which 
a number of requests for further clarification were formulated. These were discussed with 
MoD and AWE staff at a meeting in London on 27 May 2011. 
 
The BPG team was asked to undertake an independent peer review of the work on this 
subject undertaken by (or funded by) the UK MoD during the period 2000-2011 (hereinafter 
„the programme‟), and of its plans for further work during the period up to the next 
quinquennial review of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2015. It was agreed 
that the review should exclude work undertaken within the framework of the UK-Norwegian 
bilateral programme in this area. It was stressed that the review should focus on technical 
aspects of the work: matters relating to international or national politics, and strategic and 
economic policy issues, lay outside its scope (and indeed largely lay outside the mandate of 
MoD). However, it was recognised that the arms control context of this technical work was 
important, and at the workshop on 10 March, the Assistant Head of Arms Control and 
Counter-Proliferation Policy (ACP) at MoD gave a useful presentation on this subject. 
 
This presentation emphasised that the verification of compliance with international 
agreements on nuclear weapon disarmament is seriously constrained by the UK's 
obligations as a signatory to the NPT. Under Articles 1 and 2, Nuclear-weapon State (NWS) 
signatories of the NPT are obliged "not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear 
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive 
devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-
nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons". This is widely 
interpreted as meaning that any information obtained about the design or manufacture of a 
weapon in the course of verifying treaty compliance may not be transmitted to any other 
party, and some states (including the UK) interpret it as meaning that the verification 
process must not reveal any such information to the verifier.  
 
The UK, like other Nuclear-weapon States, also seeks to restrict access to information 
relating to the design of its nuclear weapons for reasons of national security. The UK 
programme on verification has been constructed to be compatible with its interpretation of 
the NPT, and with its own security requirements, and is therefore based on the principles of 
„Managed Access‟ and „Information Barriers‟ to ensure that the inspector is never able to 
access such information. Within the UK programme, MoD has hitherto defined 
„dismantlement‟ as meaning „making unusable as a weapon‟. The resulting material may in 
due course be used to make nuclear fuel for civilian purposes, or in other ways made 
unusable in a nuclear weapons programme, but that „disposition‟ is a separate activity. MoD 
made it clear that disposition lies outside the scope of this review. 
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2. Early work on verification of nuclear weapon dismantlement 1967-2000 
 
Although the early work on this subject also lies outside the scope of this review, some key 
results of the earlier work should be mentioned here, in order to put the more recent UK 
work into perspective. What follows here is a very brief summary: for further detail, the 
reader is referred to an excellent review of this early work written by the VERTIC team, and 
recently published as an unclassified report
1
. 
 
2.1 Early US work: Field Test 34 (1967) 
 
During June-October 1967, the US Department of Defense (DOD) and the US Arms Control 
and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) undertook a project designated Field Test FT-34, aimed 
at developing and testing inspection procedures to monitor the demonstrated destruction of 
nuclear weapons. This project was linked to US proposals around at that time to transfer up 
to 60 tons of weapons-grade uranium-235 to non-weapons uses. The work was carried out 
in four US Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) plants – Pantex, Rocky Flats, Paducah and Y-
12 – and involved a mixture of real nuclear weapons and fakes. An important feature of the 
project was that inspection teams of different sizes, and with different levels of access, 
monitored the destruction of the weapons presented to them, and the project gathered 
information about the amount of classified information revealed and the credibility of the 
inspection regime. 
 
The test exercises sought to evaluate the effectiveness of various evasion techniques –    
for example, attempts to divert some of the fissionable material, or to introduce nuclear 
materials derived from sources other than weapons. Four identical batches of weapon 
shapes, totaling 72 weapons in all (40 real, 32 fake to simulate evasion), were presented for 
dismantlement. When inspectors were given the lowest level of access, less than 50 per 
cent of their calls with regard to the authenticity of „weapons‟ were correct. At the highest 
level, around 80 per cent were right. The proportion of correct calls did not vary much with 
team size or composition. 
 
FT-34 also assessed the effectiveness of assay operations on outcoming fissile material. 
Some 96 plutonium assay operations were conducted, in which evasion was attempted on 
48. At most, three of these were detected. No evidence was gathered to suggest that team 
size played any part in the successful detections. During uranium assay trials, evasion was 
practiced on 32 sample operations, none of which were successfully identified. Overall, the 
success rate in the detection of evasions was just 4 per cent. The final report made the point 
that although this might not seem very high, it represented „a substantial risk for the evader‟. 
Nevertheless, its bottom line conclusion was that if a high level of certainty is required that a 
nuclear weapon has been destroyed, a high level of access must be granted to the 
inspectors. It recognised that this conflicted with the requirement to protect classified 
information, and argued that an acceptable compromise would have to be agreed. 
 
 
                                                     
1 D. Cliff, H. Elbahtimy & A. Persbo,Verifying Warhead Dismantlement: Past, present, future, VERTIC Research Report No 
9, London, September 2010 
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2.2 The Black Sea Experiments (1989) 
 
In July 1989, an American team from the Natural Resources Defence Council, led by Tom 
Cochran, and a Soviet team from the Academy of Sciences, led by Evgeny Velikhov, took 
part in a series of joint experiments on board the nuclear-armed Soviet cruiser Slava, 
moored at Yalta in the Black Sea, to determine whether a ban on Submarine-Launched 
Cruise Missiles on surface ships could be adequately verified. For the purposes of the 
experiment, the Slava had a single nuclear-armed SS-N12 Sandbox missile on board. This 
joint experiment was the first occasion on which foreign scientists were allowed to make 
radiation measurements on an operational Soviet nuclear warhead.  
 
The US scientists used their own high resolution germanium detector. They were given one 
opportunity to access the warhead directly, and they deployed their detector at a distance of 
about 70 cm from the centre of the warhead and left it to run for around 20 minutes. They 
were allowed to record the full gamma spectrum, and no measurement information was 
withheld. 
 
The Soviet scientists carried out a separate set of radiation measurements. The most 
successful of these used a helicopter-borne system designated „Sovietnik‟ to detect and 
measure neutron emissions at a distance of up to 100-150m from the neutron source. The 
helicopter flew slowly over the cruiser at a height of 30-80m, and the detector was able to 
detect neutrons produced from the spontaneous fission of plutonium-240 contained as an 
impurity in the warhead on board the ship. 
 
From subsequent publications by the two groups, the following picture emerges. The 
American gamma spectrum measurements showed the distinctive peaks of the two fissile 
isotopes uranium-235 and plutonium-239, and also showed gamma rays from the decay of 
another isotope (U-232) indicating that the source of uranium used in the warhead was 
reactor fuel, further processed for weapons use. Analysis of the spectrum also provided 
information on the isotopic composition and uranium enrichment level. It seems that no 
sensitive design information or warhead yield was revealed by the single gamma 
measurement taken by US scientists. Possibly because of the restriction to a single reading, 
they were not able to infer sensitive design information, such as the distance between the 
primary and secondary stages in the warhead. (It has sometimes been suggested that the 
fissile material was not actually a warhead at all). 
 
The measurements from the helicopter-borne Sovietnik system were able to confirm the 
existence of a neutron source on board the Slava, and the system was able to correctly 
identify the area on the ship housing the source. 
 
The Black Sea Experiment broke new ground by demonstrating the feasibility of a „second 
track‟ approach to the verification of nuclear arms control negotiations, and it suggested that 
mutual confidence between Soviet and US scientists could play a role in developing 
mutually acceptable inspection regimes. It established the acceptability of making certain 
gamma ray measurements on a nuclear warhead, even during the Cold War era. 
 
2.3 US Department of Energy (DOE) Study (1996-1997) 
 
In the autumn of 1996, in anticipation of a future US-Russian accord mandating further 
reductions in nuclear warheads beyond START I, the US Department of Energy (DOE) 
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Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation commissioned a technical study to identify on-
site „Transparency and Verification Options‟ that could be implemented at DOE facilities to 
monitor warhead dismantlement
2
, and established a Dismantlement Study Group to do the 
work. Its report was released in May 1997. 
 
This study focused on three key questions: 
1. What rate of dismantlement could be achieved? 
2. Could a warhead dismantlement monitoring regime work without an Agreement for 
Cooperation for the exchange of Restricted Data or Formerly Restricted Data? 
3. Could the warhead be identified as being of a specific type by implementing 
monitoring measures only at DOE facilities, or would DOD facilities also have to be 
involved? 
 
After reviewing a number of past studies
3
, the study group analysed the effectiveness of 
each of ten key monitoring activities, and concluded:  
 
• Any treaty requiring the full range of monitoring to be undertaken within an existing 
DOE nuclear weapons complex would have a significant impact on its normal operations. So 
careful planning would be needed to ensure that such a treaty would not affect the DOE's 
ability to maintain a safe, secure and reliable stockpile of US nuclear weapons. It might be 
judged preferable to construct a dedicated dismantlement facility. 
 
• To achieve a reasonable level of confidence that the declared dismantlement has 
taken place, there would probably be a need for an Agreement for Cooperation between the 
parties to exchange Restricted Data or „Formerly Restricted Data‟. 
 
• To determine whether a submitted item is a genuine warhead or not, and to identify 
its type, is very difficult, and might require both chain-of-custody procedures from DOD 
facilities (e.g. a deployment or weapons storage site) to the dismantlement facility and the 
use of warhead radiation signatures to correlate the signature of a particular warhead with 
those of its components post-dismantlement.  
 
• The rate of verified dismantlement would be influenced by the level of inspector 
access permitted. 
 
• There was a need for further research on the application of radiation signatures, 
particularly in view of problems about the degrees of uniqueness of the signatures and the 
alteration of signatures during the dismantlement process. It might, for example, be difficult 
to distinguish between warheads of similar type (e.g. Trident I and II). 
 
• To establish a database of „template‟ radiation signatures for the relevant weapon 
systems, it was suggested that these templates could be formed by assembling a number of 
objects declared by the inspected party to be of the same type. The inspecting party would 
then select a small number of the objects and record their spectra (either passive spectra or 
active neutron spectra). Without either side seeing the data, a computer would compare the 
                                                     
2
 Transparency and Verification Options: An Initial Analysis of Approaches for Monitoring Warhead Dismantlement, 
Department of Energy Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 19 May 1997, p. 1 
3
 For this report, seven major post-1990 studies relating to warhead dismantlement transparency and verification were 
reviewed by the study group – see footnote 2 
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spectra to ensure that they are sufficiently alike before storing the average spectrum as the 
template for that object type. The template would then need to be securely stored under a 
dual-lock system so that neither side could have access to it without the other side being 
present. 
 
• Further research was needed on the Fission-Product Tagging technique, whereby a 
warhead to be dismantled is irradiated with neutrons prior to undergoing the dismantlement 
process. Following dismantlement, the abundance ratios of the various fission products 
(which change with time) in the components extracted from the warhead could be used to 
determine the time elapsed between the initial irradiation and the post-dismantlement 
measurement. This would then be compared to the known time of irradiation, and a match 
would provide evidence of the dismantlement of a specific weapon. And because the 
signature associated with the initial measurement (made at the time of irradiation) is 
independent of the design or materials in the weapon, it is the only radiation technique 
clearly specific to an individual weapon. 
 
• There was a need for further investigation on the amount of sensitive information 
revealed by different measurement techniques, and the scope for protecting such 
information. 
 
2.4 The Trilateral Initiative (US, Russia, IAEA 1996-2002) 
 
This joint venture was launched in September 1996 by the International Atomic Energy 
Agency‟s then director-general, Hans Blix, to investigate the technical, legal and financial 
issues associated with IAEA verification of the disposition of fissile material deemed surplus 
to defence requirements, and to establish an IAEA system of verification which guaranteed 
that the material would not be reused in, or diverted to, weapons. It was judged that a new 
system was necessary because the existing IAEA verification techniques could not be 
applied to classified weapons material without revealing proliferation-sensitive information of 
the kind prohibited by Article I of the NPT. Because this obligation, although formally 
expressed in the NPT in terms of nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon states, logically 
extends to multinational entities such as the IAEA, the Agency recognised that its access to 
the US and Russian nuclear weapon complexes would have to be restricted in order to 
maintain an acceptable level of nuclear secrecy. 
 
The three parties established a Joint Working Group to consider the issues involved. It was 
recognised that parties submitting such fissile material could not be expected to pre-process 
it to remove any classified information. It followed that it would not be acceptable for the 
IAEA to make unrestricted measurements on the material, so the initiative had to develop a 
procedure employing „information barrier‟ technology, designed to block quantitative 
measurements from view, and provide IAEA inspectors with binary „pass/fail‟ readings only. 
In relation to plutonium, the Working Group eventually settled on three attributes that had to 
be detected and confirmed: 
• That plutonium is present; 
• That the metal has an isotopic composition such that the ratio of plutonium-240 to 
plutonium 239 is 0.1 or less; and 
• That the mass of metal exceeds an agreed minimum, defined in relation to each 
facility. 
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On this basis, the Joint Working Group identified several methods that could be used to 
satisfy these requirements, eventually settling on high-resolution gamma ray spectroscopy 
to establish the presence of weapons-grade plutonium, and a combination of this technique 
with neutron multiplicity counting to measure plutonium mass. The Trilateral Initiative 
experts then went on to develop and demonstrate a prototype „Attribute Verification System 
with Information Barrier for Plutonium with Classified Characteristics utilising Neutron 
Multiplicity Counting and High-Resolution Gamma-ray Spectrometry‟ (or simply AVNG). 
 
The Joint Working Group also undertook work on inventory monitoring systems for facilities 
designed to store weapon-origin fissile material. The system proposed was based on a 
sampling plan, aimed at detecting a „strategic change‟ in the inventory, amounting to a 
break-out of the order of 1 per cent of the monitored inventory. This „one-per-cent solution‟ 
was never formally adopted, but served as the de-facto reference for developing the 
sampling plan. 
 
Consideration was also given to the steps required for the verified conversion of fissile 
material from classified to unclassified forms and its subsequent disposition. It was agreed 
that managed access would be allowed into the conversion facility on an annual basis to 
ensure that no warhead components had accumulated within it, and that no undeclared 
penetrations existed. IAEA inspectors would be allowed to watch containers entering the 
measuring system, identify tag measurements, confirm seals and observe pass/fail attribute 
measurements. 
 
The Trilateral Initiative was brought to a close in September 2002, after a series of nearly 
200 meetings. Mohammed EIBaradei, then IAEA director-general, told the Agency's general 
conference that “preparatory work” under this initiative had been “largely concluded”, and 
both the Bush and Putin administrations decided that the initiative should be called a 
success.  
 
 
3. UK work on verification of nuclear weapon dismantlement 2000-2011 
 
The UK national programme developed out of the earlier work summarised above, in which 
the US, Russia, and latterly the IAEA sought to define (and in part to develop) technologies 
which would enable a host nation (the owner of the weapons whose dismantlement was 
being verified) to give sufficient „managed‟ access to the inspector to give him confidence 
that the objects being submitted were indeed weapons with nuclear warheads, and that after 
the dismantlement process the fissile material contained in them was indeed sent for 
acceptable disposition. 
 
The starting point for the UK programme was the UK announcement at the 2000 NPT 
quinquennial review that it had launched such a programme
4
.
 Two subsequent events which 
strongly influenced the development of the programme were the suicide attacks by al-
Qaeda upon the United States on 11 September 2001, and the speech delivered by 
Margaret Beckett to the Carnegie Institute on 25 June 2007
5
. The 9/11 attack brought 
                                                     
4 NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/WP.6  Working paper on Nuclear Verification, submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland 
5
 “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons?”  Keynote Address by Margaret Beckett, Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs, United Kingdom, Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference, Washington, D.C., 2007 
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home the fact that protection against proliferation of nuclear weapon technology did not 
simply have to be directed against state proliferators – potential non-state agents also had 
to be taken into account. This line of thought had the implication that verification of nuclear 
weapon dismantlement had to be carried out in a way which did not disclose weapon design 
information to any of the individuals involved, regardless of their nationality or organisational 
credentials. The Beckett speech confirmed that it was UK government policy that the UK 
should "be at the forefront of both the thinking and the practical work on building a new 
impetus for global nuclear disarmament – to be, as it were, a „disarmament laboratory‟". This 
initiative was further strengthened by a speech by the then Defence Minister Des Browne at 
the Conference on Disarmament that UK expertise in the technology of dismantlement 
would contribute to the UK as a disarmament laboratory. A limited build-up of staff at AWE 
devoted to this work has since taken place. In 2000, the team consisted of three full-time 
staff: this has now expanded to seven, and they are supported by part-time contributions 
from other parts of AWE, amounting to some 12 MY per year. 
 
With this background, during the period 2000-2008 the UK programme embarked on a 
series of desk studies and small-scale experiments aimed at developing a coherent 
approach to verification in this new political climate, while retaining its traditional concern to 
preserve the nuclear security framework of its own national nuclear weapons programme. 
The outlines of the resulting programme were set out in working papers submitted to the 
NPT PrepComs in 2003 and 2004
6
 and to the Review Conference in 2005
7
, with a further 
update at the NPT PrepCom in 2008
8
. 
 
In summary, the UK programme set itself the objective of devising a set of verification 
procedures which would give the inspectors a high level of confidence without releasing any 
proliferative information. It recognised that this objective was at odds with the conclusions 
reached by the US studies undertaken in 1967 and 1996, but it took the view that verification 
technology had moved on considerably since those studies. Nevertheless it made provision 
for the UK programme to identify the gains and losses which might accrue if certain 
information were released, but it was agreed that the programme should start with an 
assumption of zero release, if only to discover where the sensitive points lay. 
 
The main basis for the UK‟s uncompromising stance on the release of proliferation-sensitive 
information has been its interpretation of the provisions of the NPT – i.e. that there should 
be no disclosure of information to any party which would assist anybody in designing a 
weapon. However it is emphasised that the NPT is not the only constraint. National security 
and safety issues are also important, especially when considering access to facilities, or the 
process of transport of fissile material, which are regarded as matters of interest to terrorists 
or other non-state agents. However its bottom line remains that if it can be established that 
adequate verification is impossible without some release of classified information, some 
such recommendation could in principle be made to government. But any such release 
would have to be justified. 
 
 
 
                                                     
6
 Working papers submitted to NPT Preparatory Committee NPT/CONF.2005/PC.IIMP.1 (April 2003) and 
NPT/CONF.2005/PC.III/WP3 (April 2004) 
7
 Working paper submitted to 2005 Review Conference NPT/CONF.2005/WP.1 
8
 Presentation by AWE to the NPT Preparatory Committee 2008, 6 May 2008 
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3.1 Definitions of terms 
 
The term ‘dismantlement’ is understood in this context to mean „making the device 
unusable as a weapon‟. This does not necessarily mean „making the components unusable  
in a weapon‟. The fissile material, or other components of the device, could in principle be 
recycled and used for weapon manufacture. However the steps required to prevent this are 
regarded as ‘disposition’, which is a separate process, not within the scope of this review. 
The precise boundary between dismantlement and disposition is a matter of debate, since 
the first stage of dismantlement yields sub-components such as fissile cores, explosives, 
triggers, electronics, etc, which still embody a great deal of classified information (e.g. the 
original core geometry and isotopic composition). Moreover, the components could relatively 
easily be recycled, so it is only after the cores have been through a separate „safeguards‟ 
facility, in which they are shredded, and the fissile material is blended with other material to 
confuse attempts to measure their isotopic composition, that the material can be made 
freely available to inspectors. Because of the need for this intermediate processing, the 
pragmatic definition of „dismantlement‟ adopted by UK MoD is that it has occurred when the 
fissile core has been separated from the surrounding chemical explosives. 
 
The term ‘verification’ likewise admits of various interpretations. In Margaret Beckett's 
Carnegie speech, she identified the task as being to confirm "that an object presented for 
dismantlement as a warhead is indeed a warhead, and that the items that emerge from the 
dismantlement process have indeed come from the authenticated object that went into that 
process to begin with, and are not being returned to use in new warheads". She recognised 
that it would be a challenge to "create a robust, trusted and effective system of verification 
that does not give away national security or proliferation sensitive information".  
 
As we have seen in section 2.3 above, the US programme prior to 2000 regarded this 
objective as probably unattainable: it judged that "determining whether a submitted item is a 
genuine warhead or not is very difficult, and may require both chain-of-custody procedures 
from DOD facilities (e.g. a deployment or weapons storage site) to the dismantlement facility 
and the use of warhead radiation signatures to correlate the signature of a particular 
warhead with those of its components post-dismantlement. If there were a need to 
distinguish between strategic and tactical warheads, or between warheads of different types, 
the chain-of-custody regime would likely need to be initiated at the point at which the 
warhead is removed from a delivery vehicle, deployment site or DOD weapons storage 
depot.” 
 
On the whole question of the scope of verification, the UK programme to date has taken a 
cautious stance. Unlike the US programme, which has recognised that, in the verification of 
certain bilateral treaties, there might be a need to confirm that the item submitted is a 
particular type of weapon, the UK programme to date has largely been based on a „scaled-
down‟ requirement described below. However it has not excluded the possibility that specific 
warhead radiation signatures could be used to confirm that it is the declared type of 
warhead, provided that these signatures are encrypted in such a way that the classified 
information which they contain is never revealed to the inspector. It has also not ruled out 
the possibility of establishing a chain of custody for a weapon container, declared as 
containing a weapon scheduled for dismantlement, between its military deployment site and 
the dismantlement facility. It is nonetheless recognised that there are difficulties of  
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principle in establishing that a weapon is indeed of a specified type, if inspectors are never 
allowed visual and instrumental access during the dismantlement of any such weapon. 
 
The UK dismantlement programme is divided for administrative purposes into two parts –
‘
authentication‟ and „chain of custody‟, and work on these two topics was reported by the UK 
to the 2000 and 2005 NPT Review Conferences, with a further update at the 2008 NPT 
PrepCom. The term ‘authentication’ has come to be interpreted, on the scaled-down 
interpretation of verification, as meaning that the inspector should achieve reasonable 
confidence that an object introduced into the dismantlement facility in a closed container, 
contained sufficient fissile material (U-235, Pu-239) in sufficiently pure form for it to be 
probable that some kind of nuclear weapon was contained within it. Given the constraints of 
the NPT, it is taken for granted that the inspector will at no stage be allowed to see the 
contents of the container, or even to see the complete dataset produced by a nearby high-
resolution measuring instrument (e.g. a high purity Ge gamma spectrometer). So the 
procedure has to involve the host in positioning an agreed instrument, and transmitting a 
redacted version of the measured data across an ‘information barrier’, which is just 
sufficient to give the inspector the required confidence, but not sufficient for him to infer any 
aspects of the design of the weapon. The information passed across the barrier might, for 
example, consists of yes/no answers to questions such as „does the mass of Pu exceed x 
kg, and does its isotopic composition exceed y% Pu-239?‟ However more sophisticated data 
transfers are not excluded. 
 
The dismantlement process is conducted in a ‘dismantlement cell’, an enclosed facility to 
which the inspector is given „managed access‟ – i.e. limited access into the cell before and 
after (but not during) the dismantlement process – so that he can satisfy himself that there 
are no pathways by which fissile material could be smuggled out or simulating isotopes 
smuggled in, and no means by which the host could tamper with the instrumentation so as 
to give misleading information.  
 
Dismantlement initially leads to a relatively small number of outcoming sealed containers, 
each holding a group of components (e.g. fissile material, explosives, metallic and organic 
wastes). These components still embody a great deal of classified information, so they need 
to be held in a secure monitored storage facility until they can be transferred to the facility 
undertaking the disposition process. The inspector is not permitted to see inside these 
containers, or to make unrestricted measurements on them. However some limited 
measurements can be made at the behest of the inspector, if necessary using information 
barrier technology to ensure that classified information is not revealed. 
 
As regards the ‘chain-of-custody’ programme, the key problem which it addresses is to 
ensure that the items that emerge from the dismantlement process represent the totality of 
the materials derived from the dismantlement of the authenticated object that went into it, 
and that there has been no diversion of materials or substitution by simulants. It is regarded 
as unrealistic to attempt to keep track of every individual component of the weapon during 
the dismantling process. So instead, steps are taken to ensure that the number of entry 
points into the dismantling cell is strictly limited, and each such entry-point is subject to a 
system of „portal monitoring‟, so that only monitored transfers (in or out) of materials 
(particularly fissile materials) or tools can take place.  
 
To prevent the outcoming material from being recycled, each incoming container is given a 
unique identifier, in the form of a tag, and each outcoming container is likewise tagged, in a 
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manner which permits these to be correlated. Because of the long timescales involved in 
dismantling (in some cases the whole process may take several months) it is not realistic for 
inspectors to maintain continuous personal supervision of each individual item, so a 
procedure for sealing containers using „tamper-resistant seals‟ has been developed, 
enabling the inspectors to confirm that no change has been made to the contents in their 
absence. In particular, the fissile material container is protected by a Tamper Indicating 
Device (TID) which will ensure that no fissile material can be diverted while the container is 
on its way to, or held in, a monitored storage area. The time period over which this chain-of-
custody process has to be sustained can be quite considerable – extending up to years if 
the capacity of the ultimate disposition process is limited. 
 
3.2 UK work on authentication 
 
The UK approach to authentication was set out in the publicly available reports to the 
various NPT PrepComs and to the 2005 RevCon. Since then, there has been further work, 
some of which is described in restricted reports or open publications that have been made 
available to us by MoD (see footnotes 
9, 11,13,14
), and this is described below. 
 
Although this has not yet been discussed publicly, the dismantlement programme has 
devoted some time to considering possible evasion scenarios, and devising effective 
counters to them. It believes that it could now detect evasions a lot better than was possible 
forty years ago. It has also considered whether there could be a role for „privileged 
inspectors‟, who would be given access to classified information, but it has concluded that 
this would not be compatible with national security. In any case, it can be argued that the 
international credibility of the verification process would require the inclusion of inspectors 
from outside the P5, and there might not be an acceptable source of such inspectors. 
 
3.2.1 The objectives of the authentication process 
Ideally, one might wish that the authentication process demonstrated beyond reasonable 
doubt that the incoming item was indeed a nuclear weapon, and would preferably identify 
the item as being a weapon of a specific type (e.g. an SS-N-19 or Trident II warhead). 
However, as we have seen, the UK programme to date has hitherto had a more „scaled-
down‟ objective. Given this, it might be felt desirable to demonstrate that at least the masses 
of fissile material present before and after dismantling are approximately equal. One 
constraint on such a demonstration is that the UK takes the view that the NPT precludes the 
possibility of disclosing the actual masses of individual isotopes to the inspector. It might 
nevertheless be possible to confirm that the mass of fissile material leaving the facility 
equals the mass entering, though it is doubtful whether the present state of development of 
nuclear instrumentation would enable the mass of fissile material to be measured before 
and after dismantling with sufficient accuracy to do so (see below). 
 
The UK programme has not as yet included work with the more radical objective of 
confirming that the submitted item is indeed a warhead, or a fortiori a warhead of an 
identified type. As we have seen, the US programme envisaged the possibility of using 
„weapon radiation signatures‟ to identify the type of weapon being submitted for dismantling. 
The idea here is that the host and inspector jointly supervise the gathering of rather 
extensive γ- or neutron measurements on a sample weapon, under circumstances where 
the weapon can be identified unambiguously, but those measurements are then encrypted, 
and this „template‟ is then stored in a way which will not enable the inspector to read it. The 
template can then be compared with a similarly encrypted measurement made on a weapon 
 14 
submitted for dismantlement, and the result transmitted through the Information Barrier, 
confirming whether the submitted item is indeed a weapon of the declared type.  
As the world approaches total disarmament, it is likely that the need for complete confidence 
will become more pressing, and a higher degree of authentication may become necessary. 
 
3.2.2 NPT and national security constraints on the authentication process 
The UK programme to date has been based on the assumption that the inspecting party 
includes someone whose bona fides cannot be taken for granted. An initial negotiation is 
therefore required between the host and the inspection team on what the latter can/cannot 
be permitted to see and/or measure. In this negotiation, the host has to have regard to the 
constraints of the NPT, its own national security requirements, and the need to give the 
inspectors adequate confidence over the whole process. For example, we have seen that in 
the Trilateral Initiative, the parties agreed that the inspectors might be allowed to receive the 
results of measurements which confirmed that the item contained U-235 or Pu-239, and that 
the isotopic composition exceeded some specified threshold. It is then necessary to agree 
between the two parties on the specification of the „information barrier‟ system which will 
allow the inspector to have reliable access to this, and only this, information. It is assumed 
that all the relevant equipment will have to be „host supplied‟, if only to ensure that it 
conforms to the host's safety standards applicable to an environment containing nuclear and 
explosive materials, but the operating procedures have to be agreed, and to be such that 
both parties can have confidence that it is working as specified. 
 
As was recognised in the early work in the US on verification – particularly in the FT34 
project in 1967 and the DOE study in 1996/7 – setting the ground rules for acceptable 
inspection is a complex business, and involves trade-offs between the potential disclosure of 
proliferation-sensitive or national-security-sensitive information on the one hand, and 
providing the necessary degree of confidence that the terms of an arms-control agreement 
are being observed on the other.  
 
The climate of international opinion on this subject has evidently shifted over the past 
decades. As we have seen, in the 1967 FT34 project, there was a very high level of concern 
at the ease with which an unscrupulous host could deceive a highly constrained 
inspectorate, and it was taken for granted that the rules about disclosure of classified 
information would have to be relaxed in order to give the inspector a justifiable degree of 
confidence that the declared dismantling had in fact taken place. Prior to the signature of 
the NPT in 1968, such disclosures were seen as a matter for negotiation between the 
parties. Even in 1996/7, the US DOE study seemed to assume that it would be acceptable 
to negotiate an Agreement for Cooperation between the parties to exchange Restricted 
Data or „Formerly Restricted Data‟, so as to permit an adequately high level of access to the 
inspector. Certainly in 1989 the Black Sea Experiments seemed to indicate that the Russian 
government was prepared to contemplate a rather considerable relaxation of the rules 
governing the use of non-destructive testing (NDT) instrumentation by a foreign national in 
close proximity to a nuclear weapon.  
 
However by the time of the Trilateral Initiative, the climate had apparently shifted towards a 
more literal interpretation of the words of the NPT. The IAEA apparently felt obliged to 
accept rather more stringent restrictions on the information which the host party would 
supply to its inspectors. This is perhaps not surprising: the period 1986-2006 was one in 
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which international concern about nuclear weapon proliferation grew rapidly, fuelled by 
problems which came to public attention in India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Libya, North Korea, 
Pakistan and elsewhere, and the activities of A. Q. Khan. 
 
So by the date when the UK verification programme began, it was reasonable to assume 
that the UK at least should be a model of compliance with the strictest interpretation of the 
requirements of the NPT, and should be equally firm in its control of national-security-
sensitive information. The programme has therefore taken for granted that acceptable 
technology will have to operate behind an Information Barrier, with stringent limitations on 
the amount of information disclosed to the inspector. 
 
3.2.3 Relevant Non-destructive Testing (NDT) techniques 
Most of the UK work has been based on the assumption that the two key NDT instruments 
to be used in verification work will be a high-resolution γ spectrometer (e.g. of the liquid 
nitrogen cooled high purity germanium crystal type) and a neutron counter (e.g. of the He-3 
type)
9
. The former was selected because it has the highest resolution and the latter because 
it has the highest sensitivity available. In both cases, it has generally been assumed, for 
reasons of simplicity, that they will make purely passive measurements, though there would 
be no difficulty of principle in getting approval for the introduction of a low-power source of 
high-energy electrons, neutrons or γ-rays into a weapons facility, so that active 
measurements could be made. However this might be complicated in practice, because of 
the need to ensure the safety of such systems in a nuclear weapon environment. 
 
As regards γ spectroscopy, a full γ spectrum, taken at a range of one or two metres with a 
resolution of a few keV, would yield extensive amounts of classified information on the 
isotopic content of any fissile material contained in the item, on the geometry of the fissile 
materials present, and (by shifting the spectrometer around) on the composition and 
thicknesses of various non-fissile materials as well. This information can be inferred even if 
there is significant interposed shielding material, by making use of the heights of the various 
peaks and the shape of the background continuum.  
 
As regards neutron counting, the most obvious use is to detect the neutrons emitted 
spontaneously by weapons-grade U and Pu, at rates of ~1 and ~60,000 neutrons per 
second per kg of fissile material respectively. The Pu rate is well above the natural 
background (~10
-5
 n/cm
2
/sec) but the U rate is much less so. Further information can be 
obtained by measuring the time signature of the neutron count, since in a large but sub-
critical mass of fissile material, chain reactions lasting up to a millisecond can result from a 
single initiating spontaneous fission event, and these can be tracked in time, using fast 
electronics. 
 
Both techniques are relevant to the detection of the isotopes of primary interest, U-235 and 
Pu-239, but they are also relevant to the detection of other isotopes which are likely to be 
present in weapons-grade fissile material. These include Am-241, U-232 and Pu-240. 
Although these may only be present in relatively small amounts, their γ- or neutron-emission 
signatures can be easier to detect than those of the fissile material itself. 
 
                                                     
9
 For a good summary of these technologies, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gamma_spectroscopy 
 and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neutron_detection 
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Both techniques are also relevant to the measurement of the mass of fissile material as a 
weapon passes through the dismantlement process. AWE recognises the desirability of 
having a means of tracking this, and is working on this problem, but at present it is 
unsolved, because of the difficulty of accurately assessing the effect of changing geometry 
and screening on radiation measurements as dismantling proceeds. Error bars are crucial 
here. Gamma measurements give a lower bound on the mass, neutrons an upper bound. It 
is as yet unknown whether active interrogation (e.g. with neutrons) would help: AWE is 
looking at that, and also at the combined use of more than one experimental technique.  
 
There is a considerable amount of speculative work in progress at AWE on other NDT 
techniques. For example, it remains open-minded about the possibility of using X-ray 
backscattering, or dual energy X-ray radiography. It has been tracking this work, but has not 
yet pursued these techniques in detail. 
 
It is also aware of the academic work in progress on muon-based measurement techniques. 
This is promising, because it may only reveal non-sensitive information. The AWE 
verification group is interacting with another group in AWE (National Nuclear Security 
Division) on this technology. A recent publication gives an indication of the work in 
progress
10
. 
 
A further direction of research being pursued is the use of neutron activation analysis to 
monitor the presence of high explosives within a container. This technique originated at 
Idaho National Laboratory, and has been taken up by Dstl (Defence Science & Technology 
Laboratory) for other purposes. It uses a Portable Isotopic Neutron Spectroscopy System 
(PINS) – a combination of a portable neutron source (e.g. Cf-252 or a portable 14 MeV D-T 
neutron generator) which irradiates the container, together with a portable γ spectrometer 
which determines the proportions of a few light elements (typically H, C, O and N) and 
hence infers the elemental composition of any explosive present (see, for example
11
). This 
could permit the verification that the outgoing stream contains fissile material and relevant 
organic material in separate containers, and hence that „dismantlement‟ has been achieved. 
 
3.2.4 NDT experiments on real weapons 
Measurements on real weapons have been carried out in the US at least since the 1960s, 
using the weapons which have been available to them. In addition, as we have seen, some 
measurements were made on what was presented as a Russian warhead during the Black 
Sea experiment in 1989. In recent years, the UK programme has likewise made 
measurements on the weapons to which it has access, including the Polaris and Trident 
warheads
12
. In general, the results of these experiments have been surprise-free, though 
they have emphasised the feasibility of extracting classified information from high-resolution 
γ spectra of a warhead, and the consequent need to use information barrier technology in 
any exercise undertaken to confirm that the identity of a warhead is as declared, by means 
of the „radiation signature‟ technique.  
 
 
 
 
                                                     
10
 http://csis.org/images/stories/poni/111007_Cox.pdf 
11
 http://www.inl.gov/technicalpublications/Documents/3480146.pdf 
12
 A. Burjan & D. Keir, „Arms Control Verification – Recent studies at AWE‟, INMM, 48
th
 Annual Meeting, 2007 
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3.2.5 The need for information barrier technology 
There is international agreement (shared by the UK programme team) that the precise 
isotopic composition, and the geometry, of the fissile core, and associated neutron 
generators, fission triggers, etc, are highly sensitive items of design information, which 
would be of substantial value to a proliferator, so all measurements which could reveal these 
have to be filtered out by the Information Barrier. In particular, as we have seen, a full 
spectrum from a γ spectrometer reveals much information of a classified nature about the 
design of a weapon, so some redaction of such measurements is thought to be inescapable. 
 
Given this background, the UK programme has put considerable emphasis on the 
development of information barrier technology, which will permit relatively uncensored NDT 
technology to be deployed within the dismantling facility, but only to transmit a redacted 
version of the information gathered to the inspector. Exactly what data should be transmitted 
is a matter for negotiation. Since the overall objective is to give the inspector confidence in 
the dismantling process, it should as a minimum include enough information to convince a 
reasonably sceptical individual that the item is indeed a weapon, and that the dismantling 
process does not permit the diversion of any fissile material. It should also preferably give 
confirmation that the weapon is indeed of the declared type. 
 
A relatively simple application of this technology is to transmit highly redacted information – 
for example, of the kind agreed between the parties in the Trilateral Initiative (see section 
2.4 above). A much more sophisticated application is the use of „weapon radiation 
signatures‟ (as described above) to identify the type of weapon being submitted for 
dismantling. Although this is not yet part of the UK programme, MoD has stated that it would 
be glad to receive suggestions on how this could be done within the constraints of the NPT. 
 
3.2.6 The need for ‘tamper-resistant’ information barrier technology 
One of the overall objectives of verification research is to devise verification technologies 
and methodologies which can give the inspector sufficient confidence that the host has 
fulfilled its declared dismantling intentions, or that he can at least verify the host declaration 
about its activities. It is recognised that there is an inevitable tension between the inspector 
and the host over the integrity of the verification technologies (including the tools and data 
involved), because the somewhat byzantine dismantling procedures described above 
provide opportunities for the host to tamper with the information gathered by the verification 
instrumentation and transmitted to the inspector, or for the inspector to tamper with the 
instrumentation to increase its data-gathering capabilities. It is therefore necessary to devise 
methodologies that disincentivise tampering with the monitoring equipment by either party. 
 
Examples of tampering techniques which might in principle be adopted by the host include 
inserting an „over-ride‟ to the response signal to the inspector so that it automatically gives a 
favourable answer. Likewise, the inspector might wish to increase the information available 
by improperly inserting sensors which would gather data from within the facility, or electronic 
means of bypassing the equipment which redacts the information before transmitting it to 
the inspector. 
 
To minimise the risk of all such activities, there is a need for a „certification‟ process for all 
measuring and redacting equipment introduced into the dismantling facility. This equipment  
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needs to be checked by both the host and the inspector in turn for signs of tampering 
(perhaps using control data agreed by both parties) and to ensure that the function of the 
device relates exclusively to its role in the verification process (as opposed to espionage 
activities). The device is then subject to a transparent and robust chain-of-custody process, 
and returned to the host for use. Details of the certification methodology have to evolve in 
parallel with possible modes of cheating. Such cheating is potentially very damaging, since it 
can lead to the instrumentation giving falsely reassuring information to the inspectors. 
 
3.2.7 Work on design and certification of information barriers 
AWE has been looking into a number of possible evasion strategies – for example, one 
involving the addition of large amounts of Pu-238, or one involving the addition of carefully 
selected non-fissile isotopes which can mimic fissile material to some extent. Counter-
measures can be based on the fact that such additions cannot mimic both the energy 
spectrum and the half-life. 
 
It is also working on measures to protect against tampering with the built-in software in the 
information-barrier system. Because of the intrinsic complexity of the software, detection of 
malfeasance can be difficult. The current approach is to keep the software simple and 
bespoke, written in a checkable language and then written into a chip. It has to be open to 
both the host and inspector. AWE is in favour of joint development of software, preferably 
software which is mathematically provable (e.g. using ADA). 
 
It has been suggested that even if the full gamma spectrum cannot be made available to the 
inspectors, some parts of the spectrum might be – for example the 185.7 keV gamma line of 
U-235, the 1001 keV line of Pa-234m (first daughter of U238), 51.6 keV, 129 keV lines 
and/or 630-670 keV region of Pu-239. The AWE view is that possibly some regions might 
be made available, but certainly not the region 630-670 KeV, which contains all the Pu 
isotopics information. Probably any region which would be useful to the inspectors would be 
too sensitive: "If it's useful, it's too sensitive to give away."  
 
More generally, since the methodology has to be unclassified, and agreed between the host 
and the inspector, there is a need to develop algorithm(s) to be used and to agree the 
outputs to be transmitted.  
 
A rather unusual approach to the construction of an Information Barrier has been developed 
in a project undertaken by AWE jointly with Aberdeen University, based on the concept that 
an artificial neural network could be used as a means of implementing the concept of a 
trusted Information Barrier for measurements made with a γ spectrometer
13
. 
 
3.3 UK work on chain of custody 
 
The dismantlement process can be regarded as beginning when a box containing the 
weapon is presented at the door of the dismantlement facility, and ends when at least the 
fissile components are posted out of a disposition facility in a form suitable for dispatch to a 
reactor fuel fabrication facility or to a long-term monitored store for civil fissile material. 
                                                     
13
 O. Aitkenhead & J. Chambers, „Use of artificial neural networks in measuring characteristics of shielded plutonium for arms 
control‟, Anal. At. Spectrum, 2012, 27: 432 www.rsc.org/jaas 
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The process may take weeks or months to complete, and the „chain of custody‟ is the set of 
procedures that ensure that, during the entire process, the identity of the weapon and its 
components remains uniquely defined (so as to permit the maintenance of an accurate 
inventory of weapons which have been dismantled), and that no fissile material is diverted, 
and no extraneous nuclear materials are introduced which could mislead the verification 
instrumentation. The feature which complicates the design of the chain-of-custody 
procedure is the same as that which complicates authentication – the inspector is not 
allowed to have direct (or even remote visual) access to the weapon or its components 
during the dismantling process, and can only have restricted access to instruments used to 
monitor the chain of custody. The key tools are tagging, sealing and „tamper-indicating 
enclosures‟.  
 
3.3.1 Tagging of incoming and outgoing items 
Tagging is the means whereby the identity of the weapon is preserved as dismantling 
proceeds. Each incoming item is given a unique identifying tag, which stays with it until it 
enters the dismantling cell, so that there is no scope for „recycling‟ incoming items and so 
falsifying the number of items dismantled. No attempt is made to maintain „continuity of tags‟ 
through the dismantling process. (During that time, diversion or evasion techniques are 
discouraged by monitoring of entrances and exits to the cell, and by radiation searches 
before and after its use). However only one weapon enters the dismantling facility at a time, 
and the outcoming containers are also tagged uniquely, so that their tags can be correlated 
with the tag on the incoming weapon (tags are never transferred). The instrumentation used 
to monitor the tagging process has to comply with the host's safety regulations, so it has to 
be „host-supplied‟, but the inspector has to be satisfied that no deceptions have been 
introduced. Equally, the host has to be satisfied that the instrumentation does not 
incorporate any covert capability. 
 
Possible malpractice includes the use of simulated tags. All commercially supplied tags are 
thought to be capable of replication by a skilful counterfeiter, so one current AWE approach 
is to use absolutely unique tags based on random patterns. The challenge in „random 
pattern‟ tagging is to develop a computerised technique for comparing images of a tag 
before and after a period without direct observation, to confirm that it is the same tag. 
AWE‟s recent experiments have indicated that comparison of patterns by eye works better 
than computer comparisons, because, for example, the computer can be confused by 
changing light levels in the facility. AWE also wants to use the same „pattern recognition‟ 
technique to tell whether two successive photographs of a facility taken from the same 
position show that the facility has been altered. Work outside AWE on accurate change-
detection software is being monitored. 
 
3.3.2 Sealing and the use of Tamper-indicating Enclosures 
Sealing is the means whereby the inspector can be assured that the contents of a container 
or facility remain unaltered during a period in which it is not subject to direct observation. 
This is clearly not applicable to the weapon itself while it is within the dismantling facility; 
however it can be applied to doors in and out of the facility and to any containers involved 
prior to entry or after exit from the facility. The design of such seals, and of the instruments 
used to detect any attempt to break them or tamper with them, is a complex matter (see 
footnote
8
). Sealed containers may need to preserve their sealed integrity over long period of 
time, if the contents are to be held in monitored interim storage until a disposition facility 
becomes available. In general, seals need to be tagged, since one potential evasion 
strategy is the complete replacement of a seal. 
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Tamper-indicating enclosures are units which have been designed to indicate to the 
inspector that the host has attempted to access their interior during a period when it was not 
subject to direct observation. Optical fibres are currently seen as a key element in one 
possible implementation of this concept. The proposed approach is to embed in the 
structure of a plastic or fabric enclosure a network of optical fibres linked to a single 
collection point. Any attempt to breach the enclosure (even if there were a subsequent 
attempt to repair the entry) would be likely to lead to a change in the signal of transmitted 
light; various techniques could be used to interrogate this signal. AWE recently started work 
on this approach, and although it looks promising, they are not yet clear that they have 
found the best way to use optical fibres, or that this is the best way of doing the job
14
.  
 
AWE has reviewed the work at IAEA on sealing and tagging techniques, but they are not 
sure that this is always immediately applicable: most of the recent IAEA work is too complex 
for the dismantlement environment. One problem is that in the dismantlement context, the 
chosen technology has to be acceptable to the host. However AWE is collaborating with US 
colleagues who have done work on the ideas/systems being developed by IAEA. 
 
 
4. UK programme: plans for future work 
 
MoD is in the process of preparing a written statement on the objectives which it aims to 
meet by 2015, and on its future work programme beyond 2015. We understand that the 
intention is to present this within the current NPT review cycle. British Pugwash has not yet 
seen such a statement, but has made some suggestions relating to this in the following 
sections. As regards the longer-term future programme, we would like to make the following 
observation. 
 
4.1 The possible need for a dedicated dismantling facility in the UK 
 
The UK, like a number of other potential host countries, does not currently possess a 
purpose-built facility dedicated exclusively to the dismantling of nuclear weapons. At 
present, the only facilities which it has available for dismantling operations are located 
within its existing nuclear weapons complex, in which the buildings are not specifically 
designed for intrusive verification operations, and are still being used for legitimate 
nuclear warhead work. However AWE is currently in the process of constructing a new 
facility at Burghfield known as MENSA for the final assembly and for the dismantlement of 
Trident warheads, and the verification team has been able to make an input into the 
design of this facility to assist verified dismantlement. However this input has been limited, 
and based only on accumulated verification knowledge to date, which is far from complete. 
Nevertheless, experience from the MENSA project should be able to inform possible future 
consideration of a dedicated dismantlement facility, at a time when three broad options 
might be to: (a) use an existing facility; (b) modify an existing facility; or (c) construct a 
purpose-built facility. 
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5. British Pugwash comments on the UK programme to date 
 
In offering our comments on the AWE verification programme, we are aware that we are 
able to comment only on the basis of the information made available to us during the 
review process, having regard to the level of security clearance that the team was given. 
As indicated in section 1, information was made available orally by MoD/AWE, with 
discussions ensuing, at both an unclassified workshop and two classified briefings, plus a 
further classified discussion at which a number of specific issues were raised and 
discussed. In addition, our attention was drawn to a number of published papers, and one 
further restricted paper was made available by AWE.  
 
We did not have access to internal reports on the experimental work at AWE, so we are 
unable to comment on the technical robustness of that work. It was also indicated to us 
that some relevant information was generated within the framework of the UK-Norwegian 
programme, but was not presented to us because that lay outside the agreed scope of 
this review. In some discussions, some of the queries raised by the team could not be 
responded to in depth, as our clearance level was insufficient to allow a full response. 
Consequently, we are aware that some of our comments and recommendations could be 
affected by these considerations. Although we think we are in a position to comment 
sensibly on a range of issues of interest to MoD/AWE, we suspect that a rigorous review 
would require a higher level of clearance to access information and enable effective 
discussion on a number of relevant issues. Our comments should therefore be considered 
in this light. 
 
The British Pugwash team has structured its thoughts on the UK programme by seeking 
to answer the following questions: 
 
1. Is the current UK programme correctly focused? 
2. Are its conclusions about the appropriate technologies correct, and are there other 
potentially useful technologies or methodologies that may not have been explored?  
3. What problems has the programme already solved? 
4. Is that level of achievement commensurate with resources used? 
5. What problems remain to be addressed? 
6. Is the MoD team rightly structured for the tasks ahead? 
7. Is there a need for involvement of other UK resources? 
8. Do security clearance issues affect collaboration: if so, then what? 
9. What is the right timescale for this work, and what funding is required to achieve that 
timescale? 
10. What reporting, publishing and literature scanning activity is required?  
 
5.1 Is the current UK programme correctly focused? 
 
We think that the MoD programme is appropriately focused, given the political guidelines 
within which it has been defined. However we suspect that those guidelines may change 
over the next few years because: 
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• In the short term, the main focus will be on verification of bilateral agreements which 
lead to no more than a partial reduction in large weapon inventories. Because of this, there 
may not be a need for a very high level of confidence in perfect compliance with the treaty 
provisions, and there is considerable scope for „private agreements‟ between host and 
inspector – for example, on sharing of „weapon signature‟ information. 
 
• In the longer term, there may be a willingness among some countries with small 
inventories (say < 200 weapons) to disarm completely. In this case, the security concerns of 
the host country change their character, but the inspectors need to ensure that the 
neighbouring states have a very high level of confidence in the completeness of the host's 
disarmament. 
 
• In the very long term, the emphasis will hopefully shift to „getting to zero‟ globally. In 
this case, verification will have to cover not only the dismantling of all existing weapons, but 
also the decommissioning of all facilities which could be used in a „nuclear breakout‟. 
 
All of the above changes in emphasis might lead to an internationally-endorsed relaxation in 
the current UK insistence on zero disclosure of classified information, and an acceptance of 
a shift towards more intrusive inspection. 
 
We think that the UK could take a lead here, for example, by proposing a set of minimum 
relaxations of its existing national security guidelines which would give the international 
community confidence that the verification process has confirmed all the declarations made 
by the host. This would clearly involve discussions between MoD and Ministers on the 
balance between the security risks and the confidence benefits involved. 
 
5.2 Are its conclusions about the appropriate technologies correct?  
 
Given the present dismantlement verification guidelines, which preclude visual inspection of 
the dismantling process, and impose severe constraints on the information which can be 
passed through an Information Barrier, the emphasis has to be on the design of the 
Information Barrier and on chain-of-custody technology, and the main objective has to be 
the prevention of evasive malpractice. The UK programme is correctly focused on these, but 
there are some further issues to be considered which could provide appropriate 
opportunities for future work. 
 
• There is not yet an agreed methodology for ensuring that host declarations about the 
type of weapon submitted are correct. 
 
• There is not yet a method for verifying that the mass of fissile material remains 
unchanged during dismantling, except by taking steps to ensure that there is no obvious 
channel through which it could have been diverted. 
 
• The design of the information barrier technology has so far focused on Information 
Barriers with „yes/no‟ outputs: there needs to be further study of more complex outputs – 
for example, those relating to „weapon signature‟ templates. 
 
• The AWE team has so far focused on two key NDT devices – the high resolution 
germanium γ spectrometer and the He-3 tube neutron counter. This is a plausible 
decision, but in view of the much wider range of NDT technology now on the market or 
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in the laboratories of academia, it is not obvious that these will remain the best choice 
(either in effectiveness or cost terms). Simultaneous use of different detection 
technologies for assessing special nuclear materials may be advantageous in light of 
severe information barrier constraints. 
 
• Because of restrictions in the scope of the current programme, the MoD/AWE teams 
have not yet explored the possibility of undertaking more „denaturing‟ activities (e.g. 
shredding) within the dismantlement cell, so that the emerging fissile material has been 
stripped of at least some of its classified attributes, and so could be subject to a more 
intrusive authentication programme after exit but before it is posted into the disposition 
facility. Such a step would also make it more difficult to „recycle‟ fissile cores. We 
recognise that the level of security clearance we were given may prevent us from 
assessing the possible difficulties (e.g. health and safety issues) of such an approach. 
Nevertheless the balance between NPT/security constraints and international confidence 
in the verification process should be quantified for this scenario.  
 
• The science and technology employed in the programme is broad-ranging and covers a 
range of traditional disciplines. This makes it particularly challenging for a small team to 
keep abreast of related work going on elsewhere (either in or outside academia). From 
our limited exposure to the work programme, we  suspect that there are some areas 
where experience elsewhere can be brought in to help solve some of the technical 
problems identified to us. Making effective contact with the external scientific community 
on matters of potential interest to the verification programme, and „horizon scanning‟ for 
useful developments made elsewhere, is not easy and can be resource intensive. 
However, MoD has taken significant steps elsewhere to address both of these 
challenges (for example, the Centre for Defence Enterprise and the horizon- scanning 
operation at Dstl respectively).  
 
• The programme has not as yet given much attention to the role which social scientists 
could play in devising means of engendering trust in the dismantlement process. There 
may perhaps be a need to clarify the level of confidence required in advance of any 
particular disarmament negotiation. We know that MoD is aware of this and we would 
encourage further involvement with appropriate experts. 
 
• There may be a need for public education on the verification process, particularly aimed 
at non-nuclear weapon states, which may regard the complexity and cost implications of 
the dismantlement process and its verification as a form of obfuscation and a delaying 
tactic promoted by the P5 states. In doing so, there may be a need to revisit the 
assumptions which are currently being made about the constraints under which the 
verification of dismantlement process must be undertaken. There may also be value in 
inviting the P5 to consider what information really is proliferation-sensitive. 
 
5.3 What problems has the programme already solved? 
 
The programme has made very good progress in defining the operational flowsheet for a 
possible verified dismantlement facility. The concept of a closed dismantlement cell, to 
which the inspector has very limited „managed access‟, but with effective portal monitoring 
of all exits and entrances, is rather convincing. The arrangements for tagging, sealing and 
monitoring of outcoming containers, and the transition from that regime to the „disposition 
facility‟ have not yet been defined in comparable detail. The programme has also ensured 
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that AWE personnel are now well acquainted with the NDT technology that they have 
chosen. 
 
5.4 Is that level of achievement commensurate with resources used? 
 
Given that the programme has now been under way for over 10 years (albeit with rather 
limited resources available to this part of the programme during the first seven years), it is 
perhaps disappointing that the list of published achievements is not greater. 
 
5.5 What problems remain to be addressed? 
 
We have noted (in para 3.2.5 above) that the use of „weapon radiation signatures‟ to identify 
the type of weapon being submitted for dismantling is not yet part of the UK programme, but 
that MoD has indicated that it would be glad to receive suggestions on how this could be 
done within the constraints of the NPT. 
 
We have also noted (in para 5.2 above) that there are some other lines of investigation 
which have not yet formed part of the UK programme, but which we judge to merit further 
consideration.  
 
Looking further ahead, there is a more substantial but potentially extremely valuable task 
which can be envisaged – to design and construct a new dismantling facility, or a dedicated 
area within an existing facility in AWE, and to demonstrate its operation on a full scale with 
real weapons, and with observation by an independent inspectorate. 
 
5.6 Is the MoD team rightly structured for the tasks ahead? 
 
Although AWE undoubtedly has staff with the right background and experience to design, 
construct and operate a full-scale facility, the existing verification team has a relatively 
academic outlook, and could very usefully be reinforced by staff with more operational 
experience, if it is to have the right resources to meet the longer-term challenge. 
 
5.7 Is there a need for involvement of other UK resources? 
 
British Pugwash has for some years argued that if the UK is to play the role envisaged by 
Margaret Beckett – to be a "disarmament laboratory for the world” – it needs to 
institutionalise that role. One obvious way to do this would be to create an organisation 
focused on nuclear disarmament. Its status would be analogous to SIPRI – i.e. British, but 
with the participation of international experts. The verification mission is one, but only one, of 
the missions which such an institution could undertake (for a broader view of its overall 
mission, see
15
). In our view AWE could play an important role in such an organisation, but it 
would be essential to involve UK academia and NGOs with expertise which complements 
that at AWE. We are aware of AWE's two recent University collaborations in this area – with 
Heriot Watt (on pattern recognition using Bayesian techniques) and with Aberdeen (on 
neural network techniques) – but apparently there are no other current collaborations, 
though there are discussions with a number of individual academics. We think that it would 
                                                     
15
 Rotblat centenary celebration, held at the Royal Society, 10 December 2008 
http://www.britishpugwash.org/Rotblat%20Centenary%20Dec%2010.htm 
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be valuable to strengthen the programme in this respect (see also the sixth bullet of section 
5.2 above). We are also aware of the UK's collaboration with the US verification 
programme, both with the Obama administration and with the Carnegie Institute, which is 
running a series of workshops on verification. We believe that a UK disarmament institution 
could be a means of encouraging (and effectively contributing towards) such international 
collaboration. 
 
5.8 Do security clearance issues affect collaboration: if so, then what?  
 
Unfortunately they do. This „peer review‟ exercise has highlighted a number of problems in 
this area. It took several months to get security clearance for the BPG team, and even then, 
the level of clearance was such that we were not able to address many technical questions 
at the right level of detail (this problem was highlighted in the questions that we raised at our 
meeting on 27 May 2011). We recognise that this audit exercise has already broken new 
ground in this area, and we are very glad to have participated. However in the longer term, 
as commented in the opening two paragraphs of section 5, we believe that really effective 
peer review, or other collaborative exercises, would require a higher level clearance. 
Interestingly the US JASON procedure largely gets round this problem in their system. The 
UK Blackett process, which was at least partly modeled on the JASON mechanism, may be 
able to play a part here. However, the cost (in cash and time) of the higher level of 
clearance required for effective cooperation is likely to act as a barrier. In the short term 
these costs may appear high, but when the prize is an effective and robust nuclear weapon 
dismantlement verification system, the costs would surely be more than worthwhile. 
 
5.9 What reporting, publishing and literature scanning activity is required?  
 
The UK programme has been reported in broad outline at the NPT review conferences and 
PrepComs, and at a few international meetings (for example, of the Institute of Nuclear 
Materials Management (INMM) and the Safeguards Agency). However we were 
disappointed to learn that there are rather few reports of a more technical nature on the 
programme, and the few that exist are too highly classified for us to have sight of them. It 
seems to us that even a programme which has limited resources should produce both 
regular internal reports and a flow of open publications in the literature. As noted above, the 
limited information made available to us has made it difficult for us to audit the programme 
at the level of technical detail that we think is necessary for such a review to be really useful. 
More open publication would provide good publicity for the UK initiative in this field, and 
would also allow more effective peer review of the programme. 
 
In our view, this internal reporting and publishing activity should be accompanied by a 
science and technology scanning activity, to ensure that the UK programme remains fully 
abreast of the international work in this field. We are aware that AWE has a „horizon 
scanning‟ service, which has been asked to make specific scans relating to verification 
technology. We recognise that effective horizon scanning is not trivial – especially in 
situations such as this, where work which might be of interest could easily originate in a field 
which is remote from the ones that would naturally be scanned, and hence not easily picked 
up. Broad vision and breadth of knowledge is crucial if such horizon-scanning exercises are 
to be really effective. See also our comments in section 5.2. 
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5.10 What is the right timescale for this work, and what funding is required to 
achieve that timescale? 
 
The rate of progress of the work to date will need to be ramped up if it is to meet the 
challenge of a foreseeable acceleration of the international nuclear disarmament agenda. 
Additional resources will be required to make this possible. It would also seem to us 
appropriate for the UK to set itself a deadline to produce a rather substantial report on this 
field in time for the 2015 NPT review, and to consider seriously whether to propose the 
construction of a dedicated dismantlement facility shortly thereafter. 
 
 
6. Audit team suggestions for future work 
 
6.1 We believe it would be valuable if the MoD/AWE team put in writing a programme of 
work with milestones at 2015 and 2020. Ideally, such a programme should be specified in 
functional terms, rather than in terms of the technical solutions, and it should not be 
excessively constrained by the resources currently available, which we judge to be seriously 
insufficient. It should be based on a flow-sheet for the whole verification process, starting 
with the weapons located in some military facility, and ending with materials fully stripped of 
any residual classified information and hence available for civilian use. It should include a 
range of possible scenarios for the use of the verification system, taking account of the likely 
or possible developments on the international disarmament scene. It should make realistic 
assumptions about the composition of the inspecting team, and should set out the non-
proliferation constraints within which the verification system should be constructed. These 
should be specified in such a way as to create a reasonable balance between the risk of 
proliferation, and the benefits flowing from a successful disarmament programme in which 
the international community has confidence in the outcome. It should also specify the steps 
which need to be taken in order to ensure that legitimate weapons-related activities in the 
dismantling facility are not completely disrupted by problems over weapon security, NPT 
regime, health and safety, material control and accounting, and legal requirements. 
 
6.2 We believe that it would be valuable if MoD set a timetable for its contributions to the 
2015 NPT review, including headings for papers to be submitted to the PrepCom, and 
ensures that these are consistent with the programme of work specified under 6.1. In our 
view it would be helpful if the contributions included specific proposals on ways to achieve 
the right balance between non-proliferation and international confidence in the verification 
process. 
 
6.3 We hope that MoD and AWE will be willing to work with British Pugwash to explore its 
vision of a Disarmament Institute along the lines set out in 5.7 above. 
 
6.4 We hope that MoD will continue to encourage experts from Universities and NGOs in 
the UK and overseas to work with it on solving problems in the verification field, and that it 
will find ways of overcoming the barriers to such collaboration created by security issues 
(perhaps along the lines of the US JASON scheme and/or expanding the Blackett process). 
It would be valuable if it could develop a framework for such collaboration, if possible 
including an appropriate level of international collaboration. Again we would point to the 
success of MoD‟s Centre for Defence Enterprise in encouraging collaborative development  
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with (largely but not exclusively) industry, and the well-developed horizon scanning 
operation at Dstl.  
 
6.5 We hope that AWE will institute a system of preparing technical papers on its work with 
the level of academic rigour which is normal in government-funded academic R&D 
programmes, and that wherever possible unclassified versions of such papers will be 
published. This would enhance the reputation of the UK as a leader in this field, and would 
contribute to a public awareness of the complexity and importance of the subject. 
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Annex 1 
 
The following British Pugwashites participated in meetings and workshops during 2011-2012 
at which MoD and AWE staff made presentations on the UK programme: 
 
1. Workshop held at UCL on 10 March 2011: 
Gen. Sir Hugh Beach      
Prof. John Finney  
Carol Naughton  
Dr Nick Ritchie   
Prof. Ruben Saakyan   
Prof. John Simpson 
Dr Christopher Watson  
 
2. Briefing for security-cleared members of the British Pugwash team at Aldermaston 
on 4 April 2011:  
Mr Brian Anderson 
Gen. Sir Hugh Beach      
Prof. John Finney  
Dr Christopher Watson  
 
3. Discussion of the team‟s questions with MoD and AWE staff at a meeting in London 
on 27 May 2011: 
Prof. John Finney  
Dr Christopher Watson 
 
4. Briefing for recently security-cleared members of the British Pugwash team at MoD 
on 24 November 2011:  
Dr Nick Ritchie 
Prof. Ruben Saakyan 
 
5. Discussion on finalisation of the British Pugwash audit report at MoD on 16 March 
2012:  
Prof. John Finney  
Dr Christopher Watson 
 
The present peer review report has been agreed by: 
 Mr Brian Anderson 
Gen. Sir Hugh Beach      
Prof. John Finney   
Dr Nick Ritchie   
Prof. Ruben Saakyan   
Dr Christopher Watson 
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